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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                     
 
No. 92-7660 & 93-7051 
                     
 
ALISON NOWAK, a minor, by and through 
her parent and natural guardian LEO NOWAK; 
AMY NOWAK, a minor by and through her parent 
and natural guardian, LEO NOWAK; 
ELIZABETH NOWAK, individually; LEO NOWAK, individually 
   
v. 
 
FABERGE USA INC., t/d/b/a/ AQUANET, 
a/k/a Faberge INTERNATIONAL, a/k/a MARIMO INC.; 
PRECISION VALVE CORPORATION 
 
    FABERGE U.S.A., INC. 
    t/d/b/a AQUA NET, a/k/a 
    FABERGE INTERNATIONAL, 
    a/k/a MARIMO, INC., 
 
        Appellants in 92-7660. 
 
    Faberge U.S.A., Inc., 
 
        Appellant in 93-7051.  
 
                     
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civil Action No. 90-01919) 
 
                    
 
Argued: July 2, 1993 
 
 Before: BECKER, ALITO and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed July 6, 1994) 
 
                     
 
 
Michael J. Cefalo, Esquire (Argued) 
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Lesa S. Gelb, Esquire 
Kurt J. Kwak, Esquire 
Cefalo & Associates 
309 Wyoming Avenue 
West Pittston, PA 18643 
          Attorneys for Appellees 
 
Ernest J. Bernabei, III, Esquire  
Harvey, Pennington, Herting & Renneisen, Ltd. 
1835 Market Street 
Eleven Penn Center, 29th Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
Patrick T. Ryan, Esquire (Argued) 
Alfred W. Putnam, Jr., Esquire 
Lawrence A. Nathanson, Esquire 
Drinker, Biddle & Reath 
1345 Chestnut Streets 
Philadelphia Natinal Bank Building 
Philadelphia, PA 19107 
          Attorneys for Appellant 
 
 
                     
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 This case arises from a tragic accident involving 
appellant Faberge's hair spray product, Aqua Net.  The appellee 
Alison Nowak punctured an aerosol can of Aqua Net near a flame 
and suffered severe injuries from the resulting fire.  The jury 
found that a defective valve system and inadequate warnings on 
the hair spray can proximately caused Alison's injuries.  She was 
awarded damages of $1.5 million. 
 Appellant Faberge contends that the district court 
failed to make a ruling as a matter of law that the product was 
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defective.  Under Pennsylvania tort law, the district court was 
required on the basis of the averments made by the plaintiff to 
determine whether or not Faberge's product was defective, both as 
to the valve system and as to the warnings on the can, prior to 
sending the case to the jury for its deliberations on whether the 
facts in evidence supported these averments.  The district court 
did not explicitly make the findings as to defect.  However, we 
conclude that under Pennsylvania law the district court could 
implicitly make these determinations by the fact that it sent the 
case to the jury.  Appellant Faberge bore the burden of 
requesting an explicit ruling on this issue if it desired one.   
 
 The parties do not contest the main facts.  Faberge 
manufactures Aqua Net hair spray worldwide in both aerosol and 
non-aerosol pump spray containers.  Aqua Net contains a mixture 
of butane or propane, as the aerosol propellant, and alcohol, as 
a solvent for the propellant and the hair-holding agent.  Alcohol 
is flammable and both propane and butane are extremely flammable. 
Aerosol cans of Aqua Net carry a warning on the back stating, 
among other things, "Do not puncture" and "Do not use near fire 
or flame."   
 On April 3, 1989, Alison Nowak, a fourteen-year-old 
girl, tried to spray her hair with a newly-purchased aerosol can 
of Aqua Net.  The spray valve would not work properly.  Alison 
decided to cut open the can with a can opener.  She thought she 
could then pour the contents into an empty pump bottle of Aqua 
Net which had a working spray mechanism.  Alison was standing in 
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the kitchen near a gas stove when she punctured the can.  A cloud 
of hair spray gushed from the can and the stove's pilot light 
ignited the spray into a ball of flame.  Alison suffered severe, 
permanently disfiguring burns over 20% of her body.   
 Alison, along with her parents and her twin sister, 
filed suit against Faberge.  They claimed that Alison's injuries 
had three causes:  a manufacturing defect in the nozzle valve of 
the aerosol can, inadequate warnings on the can, and a defect in 
the design of the hair spray because it included a flammable 
solvent and propellant.  The Nowaks also filed a separate suit 
against Precision Valve Corporation which had designed, 
manufactured, and sold the valve mechanism used on the can.  The 
two lawsuits were consolidated and tried together.  At trial the 
district court granted Precision Valve's motion for a directed 
verdict because plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the valve 
was defective at the time it left Precision Valve's control.  The 
district court also directed verdicts against Alison's parents 
and sister on their claims against Faberge. 
 At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the 
district court submitted the case to the jury on special 
interrogatories:  1) Was the valve system in the product 
defective when it was distributed for sale by the defendant, 
Faberge?  2) Was the product defective because it contained a 
flammable solvent and propellant?  3) Was the product defective 
because it did not contain adequate warnings?  The jury answered 
"No" to the second question, but it answered "Yes" to the first 
and third questions, finding further that these particular 
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defects were each a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.  The 
jury awarded $1.5 million in damages to Alison.  On November 13, 
1992, the district court denied Faberge's motions for judgment 
n.o.v. and for a new trial.  This appeal followed. 
 
 The district court's jurisdiction over this case rested 
on 28 U.S.C. § 1228.  This Court's jurisdiction arises from 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.   The parties agree that Pennsylvania law governs 
this case.  Federal courts sitting in diversity "must apply the 
substantive law of the state whose laws govern the action." 
Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 378 (3d Cir. 
1990) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).   
 This Court's review of the district court's decision to 
submit the issues of product defect and causation to the jury is 
plenary. 
 Under Pennsylvania law, whether a product is defective 
under the facts alleged by the plaintiff is initially a question 
of law to be answered by the trial judge.  Mackowick v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 575 A.2d 100, 102 (Pa. 1990).  The 
supplier of a product is the guarantor of its safety.  A product 
is considered to be defective "where the product left the 
supplier's control lacking any element necessary to make it safe 
for its intended use or possessing any feature that renders it 
unsafe for the intended use."  Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 
A.2d 1020, 1027 (Pa. 1978).  The determination of whether a 
product is defective under Pennsylvania law is a two-stage 
inquiry.  Id. at 1025-26; Griggs v. BIC, 981 F.2d 1429, 1432 (3d 
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Cir. 1992).  Initially, the question of whether a product is 
defective, given the facts as alleged by the plaintiff, is a 
question of law to be answered by the trial judge.  If the judge 
determines as a matter of law that Pennsylvania's social policy 
supports placing the risk of loss on the manufacturer in the 
situation alleged by the plaintiff, then the case goes to the 
jury for a determination as to whether the facts alleged by the 
plaintiff are true.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated 
this proposition clearly: 
Should an ill-conceived design which exposes 
the user to the risk of harm entitle one 
injured by the product to recover? . . . 
[This is a question] of law and [its] 
resolution depends upon social policy. . . . 
It is a judicial function to decide whether, 
under plaintiff's averment of the facts, 
recovery would be justified; and only after 
the judicial determination is made is the 
case submitted to the jury to determine 
whether the facts of the case support the 
averments of the complaint. 
Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1025-26.   
 Under Pennsylvania strict liability law, a defect may 
be in the warnings given for the use of the product as well as in 
the design of that product.  A product can be held to be 
defective "if it is distributed without sufficient warnings to 
notify the ultimate user of the dangers inherent in the product." 
Mackowick, 575 A.2d at 102.  In Mackowick, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court reaffirmed Azzarello, explicitly holding that the 
determination that a product is defective because of inadequate 
warnings is initially a question of law to be answered by the 
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trial judge.  Id.  See also Mazur v. Merck & Co., 964 F.2d 1348, 
1366 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 463 (1992). 
 Our review of the record in this case demonstrates that 
the trial judge did not make an explicit determination, prior to 
sending the case to the jury, that Faberge's product was 
defective, either as to the spray mechanism or as to the warnings 
on the can.  The Nowaks argue that the judge implicitly made the 
necessary threshold legal finding in three ways:  by sending the 
case to the jury, by denying Faberge's motion for a directed 
verdict, and by ruling against one of Faberge's motions in limine 
that challenged the Nowaks' ability to present evidence on the 
inadequacy of the warning.  The Nowaks also argue that Faberge 
failed to request a specific ruling by the judge that its product 
was defective.  Based on our reading of Pennsylvania law and our 
review of the record, these arguments are valid. 
 Faberge asserts that the Azzarello threshold 
determination by the trial court should be made explicitly.  We 
agree that this is desirable.  Given the many complex and fact-
based considerations involved, requiring an explicit ruling by 
trial courts on this often difficult question of social policy 
would increase the instructive value of the holding for other 
courts, for potential plaintiffs, and for manufacturers who seek 
guidance from the courts' products liability decisions.  Explicit 
rulings would also improve the clarity of the trial court record 
for purposes of appellate review.1   However, the Pennsylvania 
                                                           
1See e.g. Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 697 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(remanding for development of the record as to the district 
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Superior Court, sitting in banc in review of a strict liability 
case, has held that the Azzarello threshold determination can be 
made implicitly: 
Nothing in Azzarello precludes a manufacturer 
or supplier, by appropriate motion, from 
asking the trial court to make explicit its 
ruling on the threshold determination of 
social policy that Azzarello requires.  In 
the absence of such a motion, it will be 
presumed that the court, by permitting the 
case to go to the jury, resolved the 
threshold determination against the 
defendant. 
Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallis, 485 A.2d 408, 423 n.6 (Pa. 
Super. 1984) (in banc), appeal dismissed, 500 A.2d 428 (Pa. 
1985).  In another recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case, also 
reviewing a trial court's decision in a strict liability action, 
the court noted: 
[T]he record below contains no indication 
that such an analysis was undertaken by the 
lower court.  While our prior cases have not 
explicitly required as of yet an on-the-
record analysis, or even a reference that a 
risk-utility analysis was made, we note that 
either would facilitate an appellate court's 
analysis. 
Marshall v. Philadelphia Tramrail, 626 A.2d 620, 625 n.2 (Pa. 
Super. 1993). 
 This Court gives "due regard" to the decisions of 
Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate courts as "indicia of how 
the state's highest court would decide a matter."  Ciccarelli v. 
Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 757 F.2d 548, 553 n.3 (3d Cir. 1985). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
court's finding concerning "unreasonable dangerousness.").  See 
also Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 1987); 
Fravel v. Suzuki Motor Co., 486 A.2d 498, 502 n.3 (Pa. Super. 
1984). 
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Based on the Pennsylvania Superior Court's statements in 
Dambacher and Marshall and our review of the record here, we 
conclude that the district court, by sending the case to the 
jury, implicitly made the necessary threshold ruling required 
under Azzarello.   
 Given Dambacher, we also hold that, if Faberge had 
desired an explicit ruling on defect, it bore the burden of 
requesting such a determination by the trial judge.  Our 
examination of the record here has uncovered no such request.  We 
note that a federal district court in this circuit, in a strict 
liability case applying Pennsylvania law, has held, in response 
to a motion by the defendant requesting a specific threshold 
ruling under Azzarello, that:  "If a request is made by a party, 
the trial judge should be required to articulate the reasons for 
his/her decision on the question of 'social policy' . . .." 
Shetterly v. Crown Controls Corp., 719 F. Supp. 385, 388 (W.D. 
Pa. 1989) (citing Dambacher, 485 A.2d at 423 n.6).    
 We once again urge that implicit rulings not be 
utilized.  Indeed, we have previously criticized a district court 
for making the determination that a product was defective in the 
form of an evidentiary ruling.  We noted in that case that: 
We are puzzled by the district court's 
decision to make this legal determination in 
the posture of an evidentiary ruling.  The 
legal determination of whether a product is 
"unreasonably dangerous" under Pennsylvania 
law is tantamount to -- and should more 
appropriately have been -- a ruling made upon 
motion for summary judgment or a directed 
verdict. 
Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 696 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988).  
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 While the Pennsylvania courts have so far held that the 
threshold social policy ruling required by Azzarello can be made 
implicitly, appellate review benefits from a clear and explicit 
ruling by the trial court.  The threshold decision concerning 
whether a product is defective as a matter of law can be 
difficult to make:  "In making this determination, the judge acts 
as a combination social philosopher and risk-utility analyst." 
Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 545 A.2d 906 (Pa. Super. 
1988).  Courts and commentators have suggested several factors to 
be considered in making this complex determination.  See 
Dambacher, 485 A.2d at 423 n.5.2  See also Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 
                                                           
2Dambacher cites two lists of factors to be considered when 
making the social policy decision required by Azzarello.  The 
first, adopted by the California Supreme Court, includes: the 
gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design; the 
likelihood that such a danger would occur; the mechanical 
feasibility of a safer design; the financial cost of a safer 
design; and the adverse consequences to the product and to the 
consumer that would result from a safer design.  See Barker v. 
Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978).  The second, 
drafted by Dean Wade, includes: 
(1)  The usefulness and desirability of the 
product--its utility to the user and to the 
public as a whole. 
(2)  The safety aspects of the product--the 
likelihood that it will cause injury, and the 
probable seriousness of the injury. 
(3)  The availability of a substitute product 
which would meet the same need and not be as 
unsafe. 
(4)  The manufacturer's ability to eliminate 
the unsafe character of the product without 
impairing its usefulness or making it too 
expensive to maintain its utility. 
(5)  The user's ability to avoid danger by 
the exercise of care in the use of the 
product. 
(6)  The user's anticipated awareness of the 
dangers inherent in the product and their 
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1025-26; Lobianco v. Property Protection, Inc., 437 A.2d 417, 
424-25 (Pa. Super. 1981).  We reiterate that a specific ruling by 
the district court on these factors, whether the claimed defect 
be of design or of inadequate warning, would facilitate our 
review. 
 
 For the reasons stated above, however, we find that the 
district court implicitly made the threshold risk-utility 
determination that appellant's product was defective under the 
facts, as alleged, by sending this case to the jury.  We conclude 
that this is a sufficient determination under Pennsylvania law. 
We will, therefore, affirm the verdict and judgment of the 
district court.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
avoidability, because of general public 
knowledge of the obvious condition of the 
product, or of the existence of suitable 
warnings and instructions. 
(7)  The feasibility, on the part of the 
manufacturer, of spreading the loss [by] 
setting the price of the product or carrying 
liability insurance. 
John W. Wade,  On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for 
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973) (footnote omitted). 
3We have reviewed Faberge's other claims of error and find them 
to be without merit. 
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